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DAILY REPORT

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21 November 1985

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CRESPO REPORT ON FALKLANDS WAR PUBLISHED

PY172022 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 17 Nov 85 pp 14-15

[Excerpts] Many of the basic themes involved in the "top secret" proceedings of the trial of the senior officers responsible for the performance of the Armed Forces in the Malvinas war were discussed in the unusually outspoken "Crespo Report" which the HERALD is now publishing in full. The report, which was obtained by CLARIN journalist Ernesto Jackson and of which extracts and summaries have already appeared, was drawn up by Brigadier Ernesto Crespo in the months following the conclusion of the war. Brigadier Crespo played a prominent role in the war and is now the chief of staff of the Air Force. When summaries of the report first appeared he declined to admit responsibility for it.

FUERZA AEREA ARGENTINA

MEMORANDUM TO: FAA chief of staff

FROM: Commander Air Force South.

Buenos Aires, July 1, 1982

Experiences Drawn From Air Force South Operations in the Malvinas Conflict

Conclusions

12. The action of the three Armed Forces leads us to the conclusion that there are three Forces totally different in their conception and strategy as regards joint action.

I.

13. The Army structure is built on theory as regards the use of the means at their disposal, regardless of how modern these may be in practice. The Malvinas conflict was manifest evidence of the tactics of static and mass concentration of troops, absolutely devoid of mobility, even within its own lines, delegating all responsibility for what happened outside the Army's "fortresses" to the Air Force's support. The internal political situation of the country to which the Army usually dedicated all efforts had left its operational training in disarray, which led to the following:

1. Low fighting capacity of its officers, who were too prone to special comforts and reticent about facing risks in combat zones.

2. Lack of communication and unity between officer corps and troops which in decisive moments left the latter to their own devices with the logical and foreseeable results that ensued.

3. Lack of training in the Malvinas theatre (2/3 shooting lessons and no land combat training).

4. Absolute deficiency as regards logistic land support which led to exhaustion, a loss of combat-readiness in advanced units owing to malnutrition, a shortage of ammunition at decisive moments, a complete lack of communications, etc.

5. The characteristics of the terrain were not adequately taken advantage of, which meant that important hills were left undefended while others were inadequately and insufficiently manned.

6. A lack of knowledge on the tactical use of the most sophisticated elements (helicopters, missiles, artillery, communications, armoured vehicles etc.) which led to the loss of these in unnecessary circumstances (helicopters), deficient use of others (artillery and missiles), and no use at all of some that were very important (armoured vehicles).
7. Favourable tactical situations were not made use of due to the absolute lack of tactical operational mobility of officer corps and troops (Bahia Agradable).
8. Low combat morale in regular troops.
9. Lack of a knowledge of air support, its advantages and limitations, which led to request for support on targets situated 60 to 70 kilometres from the front lines (interdiction) requests that were totally disproportionate to the size of the target; requests for air support on targets which could have been destroyed by a small detachment of the Army's artillery, encroachment on Air Force responsibilities, (interdiction) with the selection of targets outside the needs of the Army, etc.

II

14. The Navy, for its part, was dedicated to fighting within the internal national political situation and to preserving its resources. Its efforts were minimal in the Malvinas conflict. The only surface unit lost was lost in confusing circumstances, in which the oldest unit of the fleet was risked, without protection, in an adventure which had already been abandoned at the time of its sinking. The only other combat unit lost was the submarine Santa Fe, which was taken at a port in daylight, in other words in the most unfavourable conditions for the use of a submarine. No provision for its protection had been taken.
15. The subsequent withdrawal of the fleet which moved outside the boundaries imposed by the enemy, skirting the coasts until seeking safety in the ports -- which it did not leave until after the end of the conflict -- was an operational move which was widely commented on by the international media. At first this was an intriguing move but it later led to the stupefaction of a people accustomed to (the Navy's) portrayal of itself as a defender of national sovereignty.
16. This event was a repetition of another one with similar connotations, in 1978, which sheds doubt on its real intentions or its professional capacity to defend the nation.
17. The stubborn refusal to take part in any joint operation, opting for the non-use of its most sophisticated aircraft and the use of the rest in unimportant operations rather than using the former, even for a single operation, under the operational control of the Air Force, manifestly points to a lack of vocation for joint action.
18. The use of the media, with farfetched data, the distortion of news, the touching up of news, belittling the achievements of other Forces, etc, with the sole objective of obtaining preeminence and/or national subsistence without analyzing the consequences, is another example of (the Navy's) lack of vocation for joint efforts.
19. The inaccuracy of the little data provided by its intelligence strengthens doubts about its professional capacity; considering the non-use of its own means to knock out targets which it had discovered itself, one doubts the veracity of its information.
20. All the above becomes especially important in view of the fact that what became the Malvinas conflict was a result of the planning and encouragement of the Navy, which had no definite war plan. The Navy had neither the capacity nor the will to assume its responsibilities in its own theatre, as its own statements referring to the fact that the Navy considered itself overwhelmed by circumstances have shown.

III

21. The Air Force put its greatest efforts into a type of conflict for which it was in a way not responsible and for which it was not adequately prepared either materially or in training. There was also the fact that the ARA [Argentine Navy] had said it should not intervene because the South Atlantic command had sufficient means to face any eventuality.

22. The inability of this force to carry out joint action made all its efforts sterile and all the heavy material and human losses produced by its actions were to no avail.

IV

23. The organic structure adopted, by which Malvinas was autonomously controlled, with a complicated organ such as Coatiansur [South Atlantic Command], is an indication of serious errors of leadership and aptitude for joint action by the Armed Forces. In actual fact, the islands by necessity were defended by the FAS [Air Force South] which also maintained and supplied them.

RESUME OF CONCLUSIONS

- 1) There was no joint planning in the Malvinas conflict nor any will for it, despite the efforts of the Air Force.
- 2) The Army is not capable, in its operational tactics, training of personnel of leadership, to engage in warfare.
- 3) The Navy has no vocation for fighting and is unreliable in logistics and joint action and will only face operations which are directly linked to its own interests.
- 4) The Air Force, despite its achievements, is not prepared to operate in all kinds of theatres. It is inadequately equipped and its capacity for deciding the outcome of a surface conflict is nil.
- 5) There is no vocation for joint operations in the Army and Navy. There is, however, in the Air Force, because it is aware of its limitations.

SUGGESTIONS

- 1) The responsibilities of each Force should be clearly defined:
 - a) Everything that operates on land is the responsibility of the Army.
 - b) Everything that operates on the surface of the sea or under it, is the responsibility of the Navy.
 - c) Everything that operates in the air, from both surfaces, should be the responsibility of the Air Force, which has been amply proven by the Malvinas Conflict and has not been disputed by the other Forces.
 - 2) In view of the above, intensive and permanent joint training on planning and execution should be established.
 - 3) A war college for all three Forces (should be established).
 - 4) Joint planning at all levels with an integrated Command, Control and Training organ for commanders of a joint Theatre of Operations.
24. Unless the above is achieved, the Armed Forces should be unified, in a single corps, by means of a plan to be carried out in stages.

Brigadier Ernesto Horacio Crespo, Commander, Air Force South

ARMY EXPECTED TO UNDERGO REORGANIZATION IN 1986

PY201558 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1800 GMT 18 Nov 85

[Text] Buenos Aires, 18 Nov (NA) -- The new Army leadership's structure for 1986 provides for three basic leadership levels. In the first level, directly under the chief of staff, Division General Hector Luis Rios Erenu, are Generals Mario Jaime Sanchez, current deputy army chief of staff, and Julian Perez Dorrego, who will be appointed chief of the 5th Department -- logistics and finances -- to be created and for which the executive branch will request the Senate to promote division generals.

According to reliable sources, four generals will be retired. It has been denied that two of them will be former Army Corps II commander Victor Pino, who is still available, and Angel Mario Medone, current chief inspector general, since that office will be dismantled during 1986.

The second level will correspond to the corps commanders, among which there would allegedly be no replacements, although the sources explained the decision is up to the chief of staff, and it is being kept secret. This level of leadership will also include the logistics commander -- that could be General Naldo Miguel Dasso -- and, only next year, a Command of Institutes, which will have jurisdiction over the Campo de Mayo School of arms, to which General Jorge Pedro Malagamba might eventually be appointed.

During 1986, this transitory Command of Institutes will assume most of the functions of the Inspector General's office, which will be dismantled now and reorganized in 1987. General Arturo Ernesto Alais, current deputy of the inspector general's office, will travel to the United States for a training course, which will last several months.

Should there be no changes, as the sources have stated, the corps commanders will continue to be Generals Jose S.D. Caridi of the V corps; Jorge E. Gorleri of the II corps; Ignacio Anibal Verdura of the III corps; and Enrique B. Bonifacio of the IV corps.

The departments of the Army staff will be in the third level and their activities will be coordinated by a director -- a new post -- who might be General Leopoldo Hector Flores, current chief of the 3rd department -- operations. Another innovation at this level will be the change of name of the General Secretariat, which will be called 6th department. Its chief will continue to be the current secretary, General Boccalandro. A 4th Department -- planning -- will also be created.

A Higher Training Command will be established. The Superior War College and the Technical College will be under this new command and General Fichera is mentioned as possible director.

According to available information, the six departments of the Army staff and possible commanders will be the following:

1st Department -- Personnel : will continue to be headed by General Wenceslao Abbate.

2nd Department -- Intelligence : Its current commander is General Baulio Olea -- the only intelligence colonel to be promoted will be Gasino -- and Colonel Farwig will act as deputy commander.

3rd Department -- Operations : Its current commander will be appointed Army staff director and Colonel Venier, who has been recommended for promotion, is mentioned as possible commander of this department.

4th Department -- Planning: This department did not exist until now and a candidate to occupy this post is General Juan Carlos Medrano Caro, who would be replaced in his current post on the joint staff by Colonel Lategana, who has been recommended for promotion.

5th Department -- Logistics and Finances: Its commander will be future Division General Perez Dorrego, who will head the logistics department.

6th Department: It will be the new General Secretariat and General Bocalandro will apparently continue to be its commander.

The 12 brigades that the Army currently has will be organized next year as follows:

The 1st Brigade, based in Tandil, will continue to be headed by General Martino; the 2nd Brigade, in Parana, by General Dalessandri; and the 3rd Brigade, in Montecaseros, by General Puchetta. The 4th Airborne Brigade, in Cordoba, by Colonel Svencioni, recommended for promotion. Svencioni will be the only paratrooper of the eight superior officers to be promoted to general. General Rojas Alcorta will remain as commander of the 5th Brigade, in Tucuman, while Colonel Dominguez, recommended for promotion to the rank of general, will be appointed commander of the 6th Brigade, in Neuquen. The 7th Brigade will disappear in the new structure and its current commander, General Lategana, may be transferred to the joint staff where he will allegedly replace General Medrano Caro.

One of the colonels to be promoted will be appointed commander of the 8th Mountain Infantry Brigade because its current commander, Colonel Jauregui, was not recommended by the promotions board; this is the second time he has been passed over for promotion.

Colonel Santa Rosa, recommended for promotions to the rank of general, will continue as commander of the 9th Brigade, in Comodoro Rivadavia; while the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, in La Plata, will be headed by another of the colonels to be promoted because the promotion board has not recommended the promotion of its current commander.

The 11th Brigade, in Rio Gallegos, will be commanded by General Bianchi, and the 12th Brigade, in Posadas, by Colonel Ferruccio, who will be promoted to general.

'EXTREME RIGHTISTS' WANT TO 'DESTABILIZE' REGIME

PY202331 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 19 Nov 85 p 4

[Excerpt] The spokesman of the Presidency of the Republic, 46-year-old journalist Fernando Cesar Mesquita, yesterday told FOLHA that "extreme rightist" groups in the so-called intelligence community want to "destabilize" the government. Mesquita asserted that the National Intelligence Center (CNI) is following "closely" the activities of these groups, which he termed "potentially very dangerous." According to the spokesman he considers these groups to be "neutralized." "However," he said, "they are like explosives that could cause a lot of harm should they come in contact with fire."

Mesquita made these statements when FOLHA informed him of the statements by Sergeant Antonio Nazareno Martari -- one of the persons accused of murdering journalist Mario Eugenio in November 1984 -- to Judge Arylton da Cunha Henriques of the 11th Military district and military prosecutor Nadir Bispo Faria on Wednesday night, 13 November.

According to Nazareno's declarations -- made at a hearing that was also attended by attorneys Edson Ribeiro and Luciano Santos, who were representing former corporal David Antonio do Couto, and by Noraty Rogerio Pereira Braziellas -- that Army Operations Subsection [Subsecao of Operacoes] and the Second Section of the Planalto Military Command [CMP] had allegedly become plotting centers against the "New Republic."

Under questioning, Nazareno stated that Colonel Jose Luiz Savio Costa, chief of the Second Section of the CMP, had shown him a poster and sticker of the Communist Party of Brazil, asserting: "Now then, Nazareno, when ever we decide to oust this government, all we have to do is show that the government has links with that party." According to Nazareno, the colonel had allegedly mentioned how to do that: "As you well know, we have agents infiltrated into that organization and also have a printing shop at our disposal that will print whatever we need in order to compromise the regime."

During the hearing, the sergeant was unable to remember whether it was in July or August that he heard Col Savio Costa make these statements. Nazareno commented that it was after he had been arrested by order of the ordinary justice on charges of being involved in the murder of Mario Eugenio and farmer Joao Batista de Paulo -- the latter in April 1984. Nazareno said the conversation took place when Savio Costa tried to reassure him about his personal safety. According to Nazareno, the colonel had said: "You have nothing to fear because you were a member of the intelligence community; therefore, you can easily rest assured. If your superiors have been involved in acts to destabilize the regime, they will undoubtedly give you the necessary protection."

Army Minister Denies Plot

PY210118 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 20 Nov 85 p 7

[Text] Brazilia -- Army Minister General Leonidas Pires Goncalves, 64, yesterday said he had no information on the existence of extreme right-wing groups that are reportedly seeking to destabilize the government. He was responding to a charge made to FOLHA by 46-year-old presidential spokesman Fernando Cesar Mesquita. Pires said: "I have not heard anything about this or any other conspiracy being under way."

Mesquita made comments to FOLHA on charges made by Sergeant Antonio Nazareno Mortari before a military court.

Nazareno charged that the Operations Subsection (SOP) and the Second Section (Intelligence) of the Planalto Military Command (CMP) had become centers of conspiracy against the "New Republic." Mesquita said that although these groups have been neutralized, "they are like explosives that could cause a lot of damage should they come in contact with fire."

The Planalto military commander, 61-year-old General Mario Orlando Ribeiro Sampaio, said he did not know of "any type of maneuver to oust the government." He criticized Sergeant Nazareno for having told a military court that Colonel Jose Luis Savio Costa, chief of the CMP Second Section, had explained to him how the group would act to oust the government. Gen Ribeiro said: "Sergeant Nazareno's charges are absurd."

SONDA IV ROCKET LAUNCHED SUCCESSFULLY

PY192354 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2100 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Brazilian technology is developing with the second launching of the Sonda IV rocket. This rocket was launched at 1100 this morning from Barreira do Inferno in Rio Grande do Norte State. The launching was considered successful regardless of the problems detected in the (?transponder), a sort of radio which failed to transmit all the information to the tracking radar.

Many people attended the launching from the Barreira do Inferno Launching Center. Among them were: Jose Maria do Amaral, chief of the Armed Forces Staff; Industry and Commerce Minister Roberto Gusmao; Aeronautics Minister Otavio Moreira Lima; and the governors of Rio Grande do Norte Agripino Maia and Maranhao Luis Rocha.

According to the aeronautics minister, this launching is very important to Brazilian technology. Reporter Luis Antonio will give further details on this, directly from Natal.

[Begin recording] Aeronautics Minister Moreira Lima stated today in Natal that Brazilian space research is important for mastering the technology that will be transferred immediately to the nation's private industry. It is not only technological development in this area that is important, considering that we can already launch our own communications, meteorological, and other satellites, but also the whole complex of technological development that has made possible the development of space technology. This is a motivation to begin new research. On 15 December the Barreira do Inferno will again launch a miniature of the launch vehicle for Brazilian satellites. This vehicle is 8 meters long. [end recording]

The Sonda IV will continue further tests with three more launchings -- two from Natal and one from the Alcantara base, which is being built in Maranhao by the Aeronautics Ministry.

According to Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira Piva [director of the Aerospace Technology Center], the main scientist of the Brazilian space program, this is the last of the Sonda series, after which [words indistinct] the launch vehicle of Alcantara next year.

PALESTINIANS, M-19 'TO UNLEASH FINAL WAR'

PA202020 Paris AFP in Spanish 1948 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] Bogota, 20 Nov (AFP) -- The entry into Colombia of 100 Palestinian guerrillas to reinforce the subversive, left-wing M-19 [19 April Movement] was disclosed today by the newspaper 5 P.M. of Bogota, citing sources of that subversive organization.

"Rosemberg Pabon, Commander Uno in the occupation of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota, has returned to the country with 100 Palestinian guerrillas to reinforce the M-19," the evening paper reported in its Wednesday edition.

The report said that, according to the disclosures by Commander Oscar, the objective of Pabon and his reinforcements "is to unleash a final war for December and give 'a Christmas present' to the Colombians." "Pabon and his reinforcement group arrived in the country after a long training period in Libya," it added.

The newspaper reported that the M-19, together with the guerrilla groups Quintin Lame (indigenous) and the communist Ricardo Franco Front, has sentenced three militarymen and one civilian to death.

"The militarymen are Defense Minister General Miguel Vega Uribe, General Victor Delgado Mallarino, director general of Police, and Enrique Varon Valencia, also an Army officer. The civilian is Julio Cesar Cortes, a transportation owner.

The newspaper also reported that according to photographed documents in its possession, the M-19 had planned to kidnap General Rafael Samudio, Army commander, to "dismember him and send the body to his family piece by piece." The same document indicates that the operation against Samudio was to avenge the death of 11 M-19 rebels in southeastern Bogota last September while, according to Commander Oscar, "they were unarmed." The attempt to kidnap Samudio failed.

The newspaper then indicates that "the Palace of Justice occupation in Bogota was due to the same thirst for vengeance, including for the death of Ivan Marino Ospina, former M-19 leader, in Cali around the middle of this year.

According to the M-19 communique, "it was established that the rebel command headed by Andres Almarales killed Supreme Court Justice Alfonso Reyes Echandia before the final Army action was launched and that the guerrillas' intent was to drop the body from the fourth floor of the Justice Palace building," 5 P.M. concluded.

EPL HEAD TERMS URRAO ATTACK 'NECESSARY REACTION'

PA202154 Buenos Aires REUTER in Spanish 2011 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] Bogota, 20 Nov (REUTER) -- The chief of a Colombian rebel group explained today that a recent attack on a village was a necessary reaction to constant military harassment. Oscar William Calvo, chief of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), denied that Monday's attack on the police station in Urrao, Antioquia Department, means that the EPL is resuming the armed struggle after a 15-month truce with the government.

"We are not the ones violating the truce. The EPL is complying with the peace agreement. If the other party violates the agreements, we cannot just sit and do nothing," Calvo told the newsmen during a news conference in Bogota.

Two rebels, two policemen, and one civilian were killed when 150 guerrillas of a joint column of the 19 April Movement (M-19) and the EPL launched an attack against 35 policemen in Urrao, which lasted 6 hours.

The EPL, armed branch of the Communist Party of Colombia, was one of the three rebel groups which signed a truce with the government last year. M-19, which 2 weeks ago seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota, resumed the armed struggle in June, accusing the Army of violating the cease-fire.

Calvo said that the Army's plan was to destroy M-19, then the EPL, and finally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the oldest and best organized rebel group, which is still complying with the peace agreement. He added that the attack on Urrao could be used by the authorities to accuse the EPL of violating the truce, but the opposite is true. "If the government wants war, it will have war. However, we are to continue trying to establish a dialogue, even if it seems impossible," Calvo said.

EPL'S CALVO, 2 OTHERS KILLED IN BOGOTA

PA210221 Paris AFP in Spanish 0157 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] Bogota, 20 Nov (AFP) -- Oscar William Calvo, main political leader of the Colombian guerrilla organization the Popular Liberation Army (EPL, Maoist), was shot to death tonight in northern Bogota, the police have reported.

Two people with him, Angela Trujillo and Alejandro Arcila, apparently members of the same organization, were also killed, while a third person who still has not been identified was wounded and taken to a nearby clinic.

According to reports obtained at the site of the crime, two men on a motorcycle fired machineguns at the group, which was leaving an optical clinic where Calvo had just undergone an examination.

Calvo, political representative of the EPL, one of the organizations which signed truce agreements with the Colombian Government last year, was a member of the recently appointed Peace and Dialogue Commission named by President Belisario Betancur to promote the peace-seeking process.

Last week Ricardo Lara Parada, a former EPL leader, was also shot to death in Barrancabermeja, the country's main oil center, where he was member of the municipal council.

JAPAN TO INVEST OVER \$960 MILLION

FL201746 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1603 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Mexico City, 19 Nov (NOTIMEX) -- With an investment of over \$960 million, Japanese businessmen will open auto and electronic assembly plants in the northern border area of the country. This was said by Masao Tsuge, Japan's director general of the Organization for Economic Exchange [JETRO], who added that this shows the increasing confidence in and interest of Japanese private initiative in Mexico. He asserted that the efforts by the government of the Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid are accurate, especially in economic and foreign trade matters.

The Japanese official explained that it is important for his government and Japanese investors that Mexico achieve economic stability as that will attract more capital. He said Japan imports Mexican goods amounting over \$2.2 billion a year, 80 percent in crude oil and 20 percent manufactured goods. He added that, according to statistics, Mexican imports from Japan surpass \$900 million a year.

PETROCHEMICALS REDUCE DEFICIT, CREATE JOBS

FL190054 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 2045 GMT 16 Nov 85

[Text] Mexico City, 16 Nov (NOTIMEX) -- In the last 2 years the Mexican petrochemical industry has reduced its balance of trade deficit from \$503 million to \$243 million while creating 100,000 jobs in the petrochemical industry and 1.3 million jobs in other industries.

The technical secretary of the Petrochemical Committee of the Secretariat of Energy, Mines, and Parastate Industry, Francisco Barnes de Castro, said that this situation was made possible by a 70-percent increase in the sector's exports while the level of imports was unchanged. He added that Pemex had increased its installed capacity from 20,000 tons annually in 1960, with 2 products, to 10.6 million tons in 1984, with 36 products, with an average growth rate of 15 percent.

Despite the Mexican economic situation, the petrochemical industry has shown sustained growth and will eventually reach a volume 2 and 1/2 times greater than its present volume, which will make it necessary to double the installed capacity of the basic petrochemical industry and triple the installed capacity of the specialized chemical industries.

The technical secretary also announced that the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development will soon announce a complete program for the petrochemical industry which will establish development policy, commercial production policy, and the regulations the Mexican Government will follow in the future.

CHURCH LEADER STRESSES NEED FOR DIALOGUE

PA192038 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 17 Nov 85 p 1-A

[By Flor Quintero -- All quotation marks as published]

[Excerpts] Panamanian Archbishop Msgr Marcos Gregorio McGrath told LA PRENSA yesterday that there can be no peace without justice in Panama and noted that at this time a national agreement is not feasible because the official sector feels secure in power and sure of the future and does not want to pave the way for talks to reach an understanding, reconciliation, or national agreement.

At the same time he said that in the opposition sector there are some who do not want the national dialogue, which makes this agreement more difficult.

The Panamanian church leader said that on the path of national dialogue it is essential to ensure justice and to clarify not only the assassination of Dr Hugo Spadafora, but that of all Panamanians whose deaths remain shrouded in mystery.

Msgr McGrath said that if justice is not served, it would be tantamount to "revarnishing things," forgetting about problems, and that this would not be conducive to peace or any lasting agreement.

"We must not cease to insist on justice, because one of the biggest problems we have in Panama, and which has been long-standing for many years, is the tremendous slowness of the judicial process, which must be accelerated and made more expeditious and effective so the proper conditions will exist for peace, especially the biggest issues, which have drawn the attention of the public and whose solutions are conditions for the social confidence that is sought."

He also said that there are minor cases that must also be resolved, because there are many prisoners who have been waiting for years to have their cases resolved. "There is a slowness, an inefficacy we must overcome. Perhaps that will be resolved in that manner...emphasizing the path of justice, reestablishing much of the social confidence that is required.

McGrath indicated that in the opposition sectors there are also those who do not want a national dialogue because they believe that the only viable solution is a total change of government." "Both of these positions," he said, clearly alluding to the government and opposition sectors, "prevent taking the first step toward such an agreement."

Regarding the so-called national agreement, McGrath said that there is a deep desire for national agreement because the rift characterizing Panama is becoming deeper each day... "It is a division that is expressed with hatred, fierce rejections, and tends to go from violent words to violent actions." In that sense, Msgr McGrath said that, knowing that we live in a violent world close to active centers of violence, these are symptoms that are not too positive and lead us to believe that it is necessary to search for that national dialogue to secure an understanding, he noted.

Panamanian Archbishop Msgr Marcos Gregorio McGrath told LA PRENSA that the meeting must be held at all levels: economic, political, moral, and social.

In the economic sphere, he said that it is necessary to reach a national strategy of economic recovery. "We must get together on that," he said. That strategy must lead to an economic takeoff, providing an opening for the poorest sectors and always considering the work capacity of the Panamanians.

Dialogue at government level must be established with labor delegates, businessmen, labor unions, the education sector, parents, students, communications media, etc., which will provide a climate conducive to dialogue.

Asked whether the conditions for dialogue are favorable for a national understanding and dialogue, as President Eric Arturo Delvalle said recently, McGrath replied that "to say that conditions do not exist and not do anything is to let things get worse. I think that we should start to seek ways. It is not all or nothing, but a continuous process, and the conditions must be given.

BRIEFS

NEW ENVOY TO U.S. -- Carlos Ozores Typaldos has been appointed ambassador to the United States. [Summary] [Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 0000 GMT 13 Nov 85 PA]

COLOMBIANS ARRESTED, COCAINE SEIZED -- Colombian citizens Hernan Varona Sosa and Haroldo Nunez Rojas were detained by special narcotics agents who confiscated from them pure cocaine valued at \$250,000. The drug traffickers were operating between Colombia and the United States. A total of 5 kg of cocaine was confiscated. [Summary] [Panama City Televisora Nacional in Spanish 0000 GMT 13 Nov 85 PA]

COSTA RICANICARAGUAN HELICOPTERS SAID TO VIOLATE AIRSPACE

PA201853 San Jose Radio Impacto in Spanish 1832 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] Two helicopters, apparently Sandinist, last night overflew the area of Barra del Colorado in northern Costa Rica, Public Force Director Colonel Oscar Vidal has stated to Radio Impacto. He said that the two helicopters were 2 km away from the Civil Police posts in Barra del Colorado and that the Civil Police opened fire on them. However, they were unable to hit the helicopters due to the darkness, Col Vidal said.

The helicopters generally fly over the area when taking supplies to the Sandinist People's Army posts along the San Juan River. They do this at night because the Civil Police has orders to fire when any aircraft enters Costa Rican airspace without proper permission. It is much easier to hit the targets in daylight, and that is why the helicopters prefer to fly at night, Col Vidal said. As soon as they heard the fire, the helicopters turned back and entered Nicaraguan airspace. The rest of the northern border is calm.

ROJAS' RESIGNATION CONFIRMED, REPLACEMENT NAMED

PA210342 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 0100 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Excerpt] President Monge has confirmed Carlos Manuel Rojas Lopez' resignation from the post of agriculture minister, saying: Unfortunately, this is true, and it represents a great loss for the government.

The president asserted that he felt proud because he had received Eng Carlos Manuel Rojas' collaboration and added that he had always supported his magnificent role as head of the Agriculture Ministry. [words indistinct] satisfied with [word indistinct] achieved at the National Production Council and then when they met to participate in an FAO meeting.

[Words indistinct] strong campaign against the agrarian and livestock sector, President Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez said he could not leave the Agriculture Ministry headless even for a few hours. Consequently, I have decided to appoint Deputy Rodolfo Navas as Minister Carlos Manuel Rojas' substitute, and he will assume his post on 1 December, Monge said. The president said the changes made in the National Production Council without Rojas' participation were not intended as an insult but, even though every attempt was made to explain this situation, Rojas Lopez did not accept the explanations and resigned.

The president of the Republic [words indistinct] agriculture minister's resignation was not prompted by [words indistinct] did not report the changes which had been made. Likewise, the president denied that Rojas had resigned because he had refused to attend the inauguration of the National Agrarian and Livestock Congress. The president added that Eng Rojas will attend and deliver a speech on the government's agrarian and livestock policies and its significant achievements in the production sector. Even though Rojas was repeatedly urged to reconsider his decision to resign, he maintained his decision and will leave the government at the end of this month.

EL SALVADORFMLN DOCUMENT STATES POLICY ON DIALOGUE

PA201416 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0034 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Declaration of the principles of the FMLN policy on dialogue and negotiation issued in El Salvador in November 1985; date not given -- read by announcer]

[Text] Our country has already endured 5 years of war which might continue as a result of the growing level of political, military, and economic intervention by the U.S. Government, which has also been the greatest obstacle for the development of dialogue and which permanently plots to close the possibilities for national understanding.

From the first month of the war, the FMLN and the Revolutionary Democratic Front [FDR] presented several initiatives for a dialogue, one right after the other. At the Ayagualo meeting 1 year ago, we submitted a proposal for an overall political solution. Our initiatives have been systematically blocked. The U.S. Administration, the Salvadoran Government and Army, as well as the local oligarchy, have based their hopes on defeating us militarily, with the support of U.S. power.

However, the facts of war say something else. In spite of the growing and strong U.S. intervention, we have been extending ourselves throughout the national territory and developing our forces in quantity and quality. In 1981, we fought in only five departments of the country. In 1985, we are fighting in 12 of the 14 departments. However, Reagan continues relying on the military solution while Duarte and the high command, blinded by their ambitions for political and economic power, meekly obey the orders from the imperialists and sell national sovereignty. While it talks about sovereignty, the oligarchy profits from the war, continues taking capital out of the country, and also thinks we will be defeated in the military field which will ensure that they maintain their privileges.

The 5 years of war have shown the capabilities of the FMLN to defeat, one by one, the various phases of U.S. intervention. The escalation of intervention is currently one of the greatest ones within the counterinsurgency experiences of U.S. imperialism. However the euphoria of the alleged military successes of the Army over the FMLN dissipates and brings out in the open that we are also defeating the current phase of escalation.

Where is, then, the so-much announced military victory of the Army over our forces? The most optimistic estimates speak of several years. But such expectations have become very inexact. Reagan and his spokesmen have admitted it when they have said on various occasions that, without their military support, the Salvadoran regime would have already been defeated, and they do not rule out that it might be necessary to send their troops to El Salvador.

The situation our country is enduring can have only but two immediate possibilities: first, prolonging the war with a high probability of intervention by foreign troops, including U.S. troops; second, a political solution to the conflict that will attack the economic, political, and social causes that led to the conflict and that will lead to peace with independence, justice, and liberty.

Only Reagan -- who does not care about the destruction of the country if it will help him submit the country to his geopolitical dictates -- and the irresponsible ones who place their personal interests above those of the nation can choose prolonging the war.

Prolonging the war entails a cost that will burden the workers and means: a) a growing and greater capitulation of our national sovereignty to the U.S. Government; b) a continuation of the loss of human lives, of people displaced by war, prisons, torture, unemployment, hunger, and poverty for our people; c) greater destruction of the already scarce material resources of the country; d) the bankruptcy of small, medium and large enterprises; and e) the possibility that U.S. troops will stain our soil.

The FDR and the FMLN, convinced that we must strive to prevent a greater level of imperialist aggression and rescue our national independence -- before it costs more human lives and destruction of the country -- will continue promoting a political solution, through dialogue and negotiations. The basis of our constant search for a political solution cannot be found in concluding that all possibilities for a military victory will be closed if an option is imposed on us.

Let it not be believed that our will can be broken by the blackmail of intervention of foreign troops. We do not want this, but we are prepared to defeat it, should it take place. Our conviction is objective and our will is firm. Let it not be believed either that our fronts and the Salvadoran people can be easily deceived and manipulated in their desires for peace in order to turn the dialogue into an instrument for the benefit of the military strategy of counterinsurgency, as Duarte wants to do.

Blood has not been shed in vain. The people's aspirations should be satisfied and the objectives for which it has been fighting for decades should be achieved. Things cannot remain how and where they were prior to the war, or where they now are. Within this framework, the goal of the FMLN and the FDR is that, through dialogue, we will reach an overall solution to the conflict that will recover and strengthen national independence, ensure the people's rights to self-determination, social justice, a respect for human rights, and the reorganization of power that will truly guarantee the majority interests of the working people.

Fundamental Contents of Our Stance

1. The causes that originated and justify our revolutionary popular war are not only still in force, but have also become more evident and deeper. The dialogue process cannot ignore this reality and not discuss it. During his 8 October 1984 speech at the UN General Assembly and in his proposal at La Palma, Duarte asserted that the causes of the conflict no longer existed and that the struggle no longer had a *raison d'être*. He demanded that we lay down our weapons. This assertion is an evident lie. Social injustice and the lack of public liberties are now more serious than before the war. It would be enough to compare the situation during the 1960's and 1970's with the last 5 years to realize that the people's sectors are poorer today than before. There is more illiteracy in the Duarte government than before. Social services are more inefficient today than before.

In this Christian Democratic Party [PDC] government, more people have been murdered, reported missing, or have become political prisoners than in the years of General Romero and others. The conditions that caused the war have worsened.

The oligarchy's economic power is kept alive thanks to the U.S. aid that is directed so that this social sector can reactivate the system. In turn, the PDC and high command leaders, directly assisted by corruption and U.S. aid, form a new capitalist group and create new financial corporations, agricultural and publishing consortiums, etc. All of this strengthens the exploitation that has prevailed for decades and has paved the way for our homeland to become a U.S. protectorate. All of the alleged reforms and changes have proved to be only demagoguery, fruitlessly announced to prevent the people from stepping up the struggle and joining the FMLN-FDR. The so-called agrarian reform, agreed upon with landowners, has impoverished peasants. The human rights of broad sectors of the people who live in war zones are violated en masse by the continued bombings of civilians, massive and forceful evictions, and detentions and actions leading to disappearances.

The urban popular organizations have resumed the struggle for their rights and the dictatorship has again stepped up repression. The situation could hardly be clearer. If this war has been caused by the great social inequalities expressed through the deep misery of the people imposed by a voracious oligarchy, the inequality becomes more marked. If war is caused by repression and disregard for human rights, these factors have acquired even greater proportions. If the war was caused by the presence of a growing economic and political dependency on the United States, that dependency is now total. This situation confirms the legitimacy of the revolutionary people's war.

2. A situation of undeniable plurality of powers exists that is expressed in political, population [poblacional], military, and territorial terms. The people's war has created a new reality that basically modifies our country's domestic situation, a situation of dual power. One is the traditional power whose dominion over the country has been weakened and is retreating; the other is the new revolutionary power that has consolidated its control over a sector of the country and is extending this control. The two have their own armies and have achieved a territorial, population, and government expression. In addition, they have their own spheres of diplomatic relations and international policy. There are also territories in dispute. In some of them, the traditional power prevails while the revolutionary power dominates in others. The growing U.S. intervention in El Salvador cannot prevent and cannot revert the configuration and consolidation of this duality of power situation. The claim that this is not the case because the Armed Forces can reach any point in the territory when it wants is pure propaganda, boasting, and a lack of seriousness.

There is a radical difference between the situation which prevailed prior to 1981 when the Armed Forces controlled all of the territory and local power structures existed everywhere and depended on the central government -- municipal offices, courts, military units, military authorities, paramilitary patrol, etc. -- and the current situation in which the Armed Forces can only reach large areas of the country sporadically and for a short time. These zones are under the FMLN's military control in a permanent way. The local power structures no longer exist in these areas and the central government has not and cannot restore them.

They have been replaced by new, popular, self-managed structures with which the central government has little or no political influence. The FMLN's military units can also reach and operate everywhere, even in San Salvador, as we have proved. However, we do not claim to exert control or dominate all of our national territory.

The government may hold elections in most of the municipalities with dual power; it was able to partially carry out the elections for mayors in some of them. The Armed Forces arrived, remained 2 or 3 days, and then left because they could not remain there without risking the FMLN's annihilating blows. Given the local population's rejection, the Armed Forces' fleeting presence was a typical publicity operation and not an exercise of power. The FMLN also carried out temporary takeovers of towns in the zones which are dominated by the enemy; we openly call them armed propaganda actions and they were thus reported to the public, even though we actually have a majority political support in some of those places. Even Duarte's government has been compelled to admit the existence of dual powers; it first withdrew many municipal offices to the department capitals, and then, convinced that this was a permanent situation, the Legislative Assembly approved this through a special law.

A large-scale state of belligerence currently prevails and drastically restricts the government's activities, economic plans, legal and political control, and military domination. This is undeniable; the government is increasingly limiting its control to the large cities. The FMLN and the people are capable of establishing and enforcing salary rates for the field workers, of issuing norms and creating taxes for landowners in vast regions, of breaking the government's fiscal system by preventing large sectors from paying their taxes, of substantially reducing the oligarchy's export products production, and of assuming control of the highways totally paralyzing transportation activities in 70 percent of our territory and partially paralyzing them in the rest of the country.

The Armed Forces is compelled to use battalions comprised of 600 and even 1,000 men to protect strategic areas. These are military forces which, under other circumstances, would have been fully engaged in repressing the people. The so-called civilian defense and security corps have disappeared from large areas of the territory and the Army cannot even maintain a company in many places because it would be risking the annihilation of its forces. The FMLN-FDR power has influence in all of the war zones and throughout our national territory. It has an enormous power of attraction, authority, and recognition among the people. This prompts the government to oppose a public dialogue, among other things.

The FMLN's radio broadcasting system has been institutionalized; it could not be silenced despite all the plans hatched by the military high command and Yankee advisers. The FMLN's advance has consolidated and stabilized its activities, and it now has an enormous audience in every sector. The government itself is now impotent and must accept us as the other party's spokesmen. The FMLN-FDR has been amply recognized abroad by states and political forces in the world; its delegates are invited to participate in many international forums. These facts are fully known and cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the government, Armed Forces, and U.S. Administration has launched a vast propagandistic and misinformation campaign in an attempt to hide and alter this reality.

It is quite clear that the dialogue cannot be carried out based on recognition of the government's absolute authority; if the dialogue is going to be just and viable, it must be based on the objective recognition that two powers and authorities prevail. We accept the government and its Armed Forces in the dialogue not because they exert authority or power throughout the territory or because we recognize their legitimacy, but because they are the belligerent counterpart. The government and its Armed Forces are trying to ignore the existence of a dual power, acting as if they are holding a dialogue with those up in arms simply for humanitarian reasons, and offer them a pardon and opportunity to reform if they lay down their weapons. This is another propagandistic scheme to disguise the reality and avoid admitting it before the people and the international community. We are a belligerent counterpart and, consequently, following various years of denials, the government was compelled to talk with us. This is a reality which cannot be ignored in the dialogue process.

3. We are a political-military force that is advancing and growing. We are sure we will achieve victory. We seek dialogue and the negotiated solution because we want to close the path to greater levels of interventions in our fatherland, rescue national independence, and avoid a high social cost for our people. The government and the Armed Forces, although trying to use it as a maneuver, were forced to accept the beginning of the dialogue when they realized after 4 years of war that not only could they not defeat us militarily, but also, on the contrary, they had been losing ground and control in the country. We have been defeating the counterinsurgency plans designed by the Yankee advisers one after the other. The U.S. aid amounts to \$2 billion and thanks to this the Army has grown from 12,000 to 50,000 troops and has multiplied its air and fire power. However, they have not been able to prevent the war from reaching the vital areas of the country and practically extending throughout all of the national territory, nor have they been able to prevent our forces from continuing to develop in quality and quantity.

The process of the continuous advance of our forces gives a solid, objective basis to the possibility that the FMLN will achieve victory. For this reason, General Vides Casanova recently said in Paraguay that he will not hesitate to request the intervention of U.S. troops if we advance further and grow. On their part, Reagan and his spokesmen also admitted this when they stated on various occasions that if the Salvadoran regime does not receive support the FMLN can defeat it and, therefore, they do not rule out that their troops might have to be sent to El Salvador.

It is clear to us that the most precious asset of the homeland is its independence and alongside the people we will not make a compromise by sacrificing it. We will never agree to surrender the people's weapons and to give up the achievement of their aspirations in exchange for a stop to the threat of U.S. invasion. That is why we simultaneously devote all of our efforts to opening the path of dialogue seeking to prevent the loss of lives and destruction. We are preparing ourselves and the people to resist, to bog down, and to expel the invaders if they invade. We are completely convinced that by placing all of El Salvador on a struggle footing we will achieve this.

Our experience of 5 years of war makes us sure of our heroic people's capacity for sacrifice and combat. With the aforementioned perspectives and objectives, the agreements at the recent meeting of the FMLN General Command in Morazan emerged.

The unification of our strategic thought and our actions lay the firm foundations for our establishment as a single revolutionary army and party capable of directing all of the aspects of the current and future phase of the war; an increase in our leadership capacity; the multiplication of the levels of popular organization; the incorporation of all of the people in the war; the widening of the war to the entire country, to the cities, and rural areas; and the search for a negotiated political solution.

4. Democracy cannot be achieved without independence. The U.S. intervention in our country must end in order to achieve peace. Therefore, the process of dialogue and negotiation must resolve this essential aspect. The main obstacle to the achievement of peace through dialogue is the control that the current U.S. administration exercises over the Armed Forces and the government. That objective has been repeatedly stated by President Reagan who seeks to impose a military defeat on the Salvadoran revolution on behalf of what he considers U.S. strategic interests. In other words, he seeks to dominate Central America and the Caribbean and to discourage the Latin American peoples anti-imperialist, liberation struggle. As long as the U.S. supplies of weapons continue and as long as the Pentagon's militarymen continue acting in our country, the U.S. Government will continue to prolong the war, taking it even to an invasion by U.S. troops.

Therefore, the key problem that must be resolved by the dialogue to achieve peace is that of national independence, beginning with a halt to the supply of weapons and dollars for the war and the departure of the U.S. advisers from the country. The dialogue will show whether the government and its Armed Forces are courageous and whether they still have sufficient patriotism to advance towards peace against the will of the U.S. Government. A country without independence cannot live in democracy. The people's right to decide their destiny, which is the essence of democracy, cannot be exercised in an increasingly intervened country. There can be elections but no democracy.

5. The government is an interlocutor in the dialogue because it is the belligerent counterpart and not because the past electoral processes are legitimate. Those electoral processes are an integral part of the counterinsurgency plan and they lack any validity. Therefore, there is no independence and the elections have been controlled by the same genocidal and repressive Armed Forces that are now totally subordinate to the U.S. Government. Thus, we do not accept the government's legitimacy.

A. There is much public evidence that Reagan estimated that the FMLN would be defeated with his aid before August or September 1981. That is why he did not believe it was necessary to include a complex political plan along with his initial military plan. In addition, the plan of reforms with repression that had been supported by his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had already failed. Duarte and the PDC had been the standard-bearers of that plan in 1980. Thus, Reagan decided to place all of his hopes solely on the military plan. A calm and convenient political reorganization in line with the U.S. interests was supposed to come after that plan. In August 1981, the U.S. Government had to admit that the war would extend beyond what had been estimated; therefore, it had to increase its military aid and escalate its intervention in El Salvador. That reality made it essential for Reagan to accompany the military plan with a political plan that would justify before the U.S. people and Congress the U.S. involvement in order to obtain a rapid approval of the supplies of weapons and dollars.

B. In this way, the government of Duarte and Christian Democracy was cast as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy even though the United States found the path to achieve this difficult. At that time, Reagan believed it was sufficient for the political plan to include the implementation of an electoral timetable in El Salvador that would give a new legal and centrist image to the old and bloodthirsty dictatorship. In effect, Reagan publicly ordered the holding of the March 1982 elections. He supplied the funds to finance them and he sent technicians to organize the machinery of the Central Electoral Council. In this way, Constituent Assembly elections were convoked to appoint a provisional government to replace the junta and to draft a constitution. The voter turnout in the 1983 elections was artificially blown up by taking advantage of the absence of the electoral registry and with the trick of drastically reducing the number of polls: There were big crowds and long lines that looked good in the propaganda photos.

The thus elected Constituent Assembly was unable to reach agreement to appoint the provisional government. Reagan had not considered such a setback but he decided to act quickly to reestablish control over the events. He sent General Vernon Walters to straighten up the high command and to impose on the parties the appointment of the provisional president whom he chose. In this way, the obedient political parties that participated in the farce appointed Alvaro Magana as Salvadoran provisional president at the same time that they showed their independence by appointing assassin Roberto D'Aubuisson as president of the Constituent Assembly. Alvaro Magana was not a leader of any of the parties and his name had not been submitted for the consideration of the people during the electoral process. Reagan's will was carried out. The elections served to increase the military aid and the U.S. intervention. In other words, they served to prolong the war and to end the national sovereignty and independence rather than to bring peace closer or to lay the foundations for democracy as the voters had been promised.

Reagan set a new deadline, October 1983, to defeat us with the use of the rapid deployment battalions that were quickly trained and armed, and with the increase in military aid approved by Congress as a result of the electoral program imposed in El Salvador. The Ramon Belloso Battalion was organized and trained in the United States and came here with the propaganda that it would change the course of the war in favor of the government. Reagan's calculations failed again but obstinately seeking to defeat us and to show the effectiveness of his reactionary and aggressive policy, he increased the speed and size of the escalation of his military intervention. He created the U.S. training center for Salvadoran troops in Honduras and he formed the Manuel Jose Arce rapid deployment battalion there. This more complex counterinsurgency plan required the reorganization of the Armed Forces and their high command and a political plan to win over the popular forces from the FMLN-FDR. The Cazadores battalions, the helicopter transported troops, and other special forces were created. General Garcia was replaced and officers who were more identified with the U.S. military ideas were placed in the high command. These include Vides Casanova, Blandon, and Mendez. Monterrosa was promoted to the command of the eastern region troops, etcetera. This was complemented with the imposition of Duarte and the PDC in the government in order to give the dictatorship a centrist appearance. For this cosmetic change, the electoral tool was again necessary.

Impatient over the congressional resistance to unconditionally approve more supplies of weapons and economic aid for the Salvadoran dictatorship and displeased over the Salvadoran oligarchy's refusal to hold presidential elections, Reagan sent his special ambassador Richard Stone to demand that the elections be advanced to December 1983. They were finally held in March 1984, again with the U.S. Government financing, organizing, and promoting them abroad. Duarte's two main propaganda points during his campaign were the so-called social pact, which was a promise of changes in favor of workers, and the promise that he would seek a negotiated peace. He later betrayed both promises. The words social pact are no longer present in Duarte's language. His promise to seek peace only prompted the orchestration of a dialogue to obtain more military aid and justify a greater intervention by the Reagan government, thus prolonging the war.

In the months that followed the March 1985 elections and taking into account that there wouldn't be elections for the next 3 years, Duarte openly proposed the theory of everything for the war as the theme of his basic policy. According to this policy, the war budget comes first and workers must sacrifice because the government cannot use the money to improve miserable salaries or take care of education or health; it must finance the Army and the security organizations instead.

C. Duarte and the PDC do not represent the will of the majority of the people. The total votes allegedly cast in the March 1985 elections represents 41 percent of the number of citizens eligible to vote. It is approximately 24 percent less than the total of those who allegedly went to the polls in March 1984. Absenteeism was so obvious that the total figures could not be exaggerated that much. If one subtracts the number of blank, nil, challenged [impugnados], and missing votes from the votes cast, the votes cast for all the parties are narrowed down to 30 percent of the total eligible citizens. Then, the PDC got approximately 16 percent of this total. The PDC representation in the Legislative Assembly is even less than 16 percent of the Salvadorans if we take into consideration that many of the ballots were marked by the Army in favor of the PDC in areas under FMLN control where the Army entered on the day of the elections.

In addition, the workers of the Central Elections Council publicly charged that the election results had been altered. But there is more; those who went to the polls and left void ballots wrote phrases repudiating the regime on those ballots. In addition, blank votes are also a silent rejection. These weren't just a few votes because the blank and void votes amounted to 131,672; almost as much as the votes that the PCN [National Conciliation Party] PAISA [Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party], and the PPS [Salvadoran Popular Party] received: 1,133,165. [figures as heard]

The pre-war elections were fraudulent and those held after 1983 are a new kind of fraud imposed by the Reagan administration with the cooperation of the Armed Forces. Therefore, the government and the deputies that resulted from that fraud are acting -- and very much aware of it -- within the limits of the interests of their sponsors.

A government that cooperates with the violation of and the disregard for independence cannot be legitimate even if it was allegedly elected. We held talks with it not because we recognize its legitimacy but because it heads the belligerent counterpart with which we must negotiate.

6. In the present conditions, none of the parties can seek, through the dialogue, the unilateral surrender or disarmament of the other and much less propose it as a pre-condition. This is being done by the government in its peace proposal unrealistically. Taking into consideration the reality of the advance of our forces and the existence of a double power [doble poder] and, aside from the reasons and motives that led each of the belligerent parties to the dialogue, none of the parties can expect the result of this dialogue to involve the surrender of the other party.

Duarte's attempt to obtain FMLN disarmament or surrender at the negotiating table is completely unrealistic because the Armed Forces cannot even achieve this on the battlefield. Such attempts are a deliberately negative way of obstructing the dialogue.

7. We do not recognize the country's Constitution because the process used to draft it and the historical foundation it is based on are vitiated. They are trying to make the existing unjust economic, social, and political order eternal and to cover up the U.S. counterinsurgency plan we are defeating.

A new constitution will stem from the liberation and self-determination that the Salvadoran will achieve. This constitution will lay the groundwork for a just and free society.

It is claimed that the Constitution is legitimate because it stemmed from democratic elections. This is not a strong claim. It belongs to the set of appearances needed within the strategic scheme of the counterinsurgency plan that is being defeated by the FMLN.

The Constituent Assembly was the result of an electoral masquerade ordered and financed by the U.S. Government in March 1982. These elections were held under a state of siege and intense repression. The people were led to the polls through a combination of a diversified repressive pressure and the lie that those elections would lead to peace.

The Constitution was drafted and discussed within the framework of a dispute involving the interests affected by the U.S. counterinsurgency plan. The interests affected were those of the PDC, as well as the economic and political interests of the oligarchy represented by ARENA [Nationalist Republican Alliance] whose top leader is the murderer of Monsignor Romero and the death squads' candidate who headed the so-called Constituent Assembly.

This new constitution was drafted completely disregarding the interests of the workers and without their participation. The constitution, among other unpopular articles, attempted to legitimize the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a few, spoiling the agrarian reform and guaranteeing the control of the country's main exports to a small group of large landowners.

Those who drafted the Constitution, boasting of their ridiculous attempt to prevent the course of history and crush the people's indomitable determination to be free, included in its text that if the people exercise their right to rebel, then they do not have the power to abolish or change the constitution. Thanks to an imposed and unpopular Constituent Assembly, an effort was made to tie the people down to an eternal social order that is unjust and repressive. Within this context, it is explainable that Duarte, the top command of the Armed Forces, the oligarchy, and Yankee imperialism insist that the dialogue will be built within the limits of this constitutional order. In view of such mockery, the FDR and the FMLN do not recognize that constitution as the framework to negotiate peace.

A new constitution must stem from our people's right to self-determination. It will be a new constitution that guarantees the people's interest and institutionalizes the groundwork for a new, just, and free society.

8. A negotiated peace through dialogue must include the formation for a provisional government with broad participation including the FDR and the FMLN, while maintaining the FMLN's armed power, as well as the sectors that make up the present government and their armed forces. This provisional government would solve pending problems, including the existence of two armies, and would create the conditions that would allow the Salvadoran people to democratically and freely decide the country's future through truly free and clean elections.

The completion of a peace agreement calls for a government that puts into practice the measures needed to implement this agreement. It would be unrealistic to expect that one of the parties trusts the good intentions of the other party. Consequently, the two belligerent parties and the other interested social sectors must participate in this government. In other words, it would be a government with a broad participation. It would be a provisional government and its mission would be to guarantee compliance with the peace agreement and to create the conditions to respect democratic liberties and human rights, as well as the establishment of minimum reforms for a just social order. This provisional government would cease to exist with the holding of the first free, democratic elections in the nation's history.

At the beginning of the provisional government, the two parties would keep their respective armies. Many problems that stem from the ongoing war, including the existence of two armies, would be solved during this government. We are not demanding the disarmament of the Armed Forces or the resignation of the present government. We are demanding that they join the process for the mechanisms that will create the peace accord. The counterpart cannot either demand the disarmament of the FMLN or try to exclude the FDR and the FMLN from participating in a provisional government. The FMLN keeping its weapons is the main guarantee that the people's interests will be respected and the working people's wishes will come true.

We are willing to negotiate and agree on the transition to a new society that saves lives, prevents further destruction, and even allows those sectors whose privileges will be affected to participate in the debates to decide the country's course. It will be a society that will allow these sectors to adjust to the new situation if they wish to do so. To prevent this change, they would have to defeat us, but that is already impossible.

To insist on seeking our defeat would only lead to bringing about the aggression of U.S. troops, staining our fatherland with the blood of its children, spreading the war to Central America, generalizing destruction, and increasing the people's hatred for their oppressors and traitors.

The change will be implemented in the long run, in fact, more radically. The FMLN was born from the Salvadoran people who are committed to this change and together with them we will not permit the continuation of the present unjust social, economic, and political system. We will not permit El Salvador to overtly or covertly become a U.S. colony like Taiwan, South Korea, or Puerto Rico for the sake of saving it.

9. The idea of the humanization [of the conflict] assumes that the war will continue. The true humanization of the conflict can only be reached through a just, overall, political solution. The idea that the weapons will be gradually silenced only through successive humanization agreements is false.

The humanization of the conflict involves many problems that must be solved through dialogue. There are problems regarding the treatment and exchange of prisoners; and end to the bombings and the use of other weapons against the civilian population, the medical personnel, the hospitals, the clinics, the schools, etcetera; the end to tortures and disappearances; the treatment of the wounded and those crippled by the war; and the suspension of the draft, etc. However, one must know that to negotiate these issues means that the war continues and that as long as there is war, there can be no overall humanization of the conflict. A full humanization is a just, political, and overall solution. There can be no other way.

We are staunch supporters of this political solution, and for this reason we presented an overall and global solution to the Ayagualo meeting, which Duarte said he was not willing to discuss.

The idea that through successive humanization agreements the weapons can be gradually silenced is not serious or realistic and is used to deceive people. This deceitful proposal ignores solutions to the political, social, and economic causes that prompted the war and leaves unsolved the essential problem of national independence and the strengthening of the oppressive and repressive machinery used through the intervention of the U.S. Government in the country's domestic affairs thus avoiding giving peace a solid base of independence, justice, and democracy, which are the only elements that can make peace possible and lasting.

We will not accept Duarte's attempt to reduce the dialogue to a discussion of an alleged humanization of the conflict. However, we categorically reiterate that we are willing to discuss -- within a plan for overall solutions -- aspects of the humanization of the conflict which we already mentioned.

10. We will strive at all times to carry out a dialogue for an overall negotiated solution. Consequently, we reject the Duarte government's continued use of this dialogue as a maneuver favoring Reagan's policy against the Salvadoran people and its aggression and blackmail against Nicaragua.

Duarte has used this dialogue to: 1. Obtain military and economic aid to continue the war. 2. To present a false national and international image. 3. To help Reagan justify blackmail against Nicaragua demanding that the Sandinist people's government negotiate with mercenaries.

The attempt to use the dialogue as a maneuver, thus destroying it in practice, has been clearly stated by Duarte himself:

1. In late July, during an appearance before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Napoleon Duarte said that the dialogue is necessary to obtain the support of the Democratic and Republican parties for the military aid at the U.S. Congress where he had found difficulties before.

Duarte told the businessmen at that meeting that they should not fear the results of the dialogue because he had a clever plan to corner the FMLN, warning it to put aside sabotage with the proposal of a humanization of the conflict.

2. Another interest that Duarte had in the dialogue was to obtain votes exploiting hopes and desires for peace.

3. In pretending to hold a dialogue with the FMLN and FDR, Duarte's third interest is to satisfy the political need of the U.S. President's aggressive strategy. Reagan threatened to send his troops to Nicaragua if the Sandinist government refuses to negotiate with the counterrevolutionaries managed by the CIA.

To convince the U.S. people and the international public initiative, Reagan argued that just like Duarte's dialogues with the FDR and FMLN, Commander Daniel Ortega can do likewise with the contras. Regarding this, it is time to put things where they belong. We are a truly nationalistic government that stemmed from the long historical process of the Salvadoran people's struggle for freedom and social independence.

That is why the FMLN-FDR has always been an internal movement whose bases of support and rearguard territory are inside our country despite its small size. We advance and grow militarily and politically inside our homeland's borders.

The anti-Nicaraguan mercenary forces have been organized by the CIA with the remnants of Somoza's National Guard, which was defeated by Sandino's people, and with thugs, adventurers, and traitors who have sold out for dollars. They are forces that do not have roots in Nicaragua. In order to militarily operate, Reagan has had to ensure them rearguard territory ceded by the obedient neighboring governments and to support them with the permanent presence in Honduran soil of U.S. troops whose sailors and pilots have many times directly participated in sea and air actions against Nicaragua.

The contras are a mercenary force that cannot exist without the training, financing, and the many weapons that the U.S. Government has given them. It cannot fight without CIA leadership. This explains why in less than 2 years they formed a 12,000-man army that is superequipped and structured like a state force. Reagan has said repeatedly that the contras would be defeated if they did not have U.S. aid. This is exactly what Reagan has said about the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

In short, a comparison between the FMLN-FDR and the CIA's Nicaraguan mercenaries cannot be made. However, comparison can be established between the CIA's Nicaraguan mercenaries and the increasingly North Americanized Armed Forces against which the Salvadoran people fight.

11. The sabotage of the war economy is a strategic weapon of the people and the FMLN. It is negotiable in exchange for the government's and its Armed Forces' relinquishing of equally strategic weapons. Sabotage against the war economy is a strategic weapon of the people's war and not a human rights problem, as Duarte seeks to portray it. We would never negotiate that weapon under the premise of the humanization of the conflict. If the government and its Armed Forces were prepared to abandon their weapons, which are strategically equivalent to sabotage, we would be prepared to consider it and to contribute to reaching an agreement on this matter.

12. The Duarte government dumps a large share of the war costs on the working people and in addition receives a great deal of U.S. Government aid. Yet the people basically maintain the revolutionary war. The FMLN claims the right to impose a war tax on the landowners and big capitalists who are cooperating with the repression and are guilty of social injustice. We will discuss this issue. We are prepared to negotiate it if the government and its Armed Forces are prepared to give up Reagan's financing. The U.S. financing of the counterinsurgency war the Salvadoran people must face every day is implemented by pillaging Latin American and Third World countries. The U.S. Government's financing of an unjust war is also a source of large-scale corruption for the top military officers, Duarte government officials, and political parties supporting the imperialist intervention. It constitutes mortgaging the nation's independence and sovereignty. While the fees the FMLN charges wealthy antirevolutionaries specifically reflect the purity and independence of the Salvadoran people's struggle to achieve their historic and national objectives, the Reagan administration's financing of the counterinsurgency has already resulted in the deaths of approximately 60,000 civilians killed by the Armed Forces and their overt and clandestine paramilitary structures. Likewise, this financing has led to the destruction of entire villages and the economic base for low-income groups, which results in thousands of displaced persons and refugees. There is nothing more inhuman in our country than the genocide abetted by the Yankee imperialists and paid for with dollars which -- to make matters worse -- constitute a huge debt the Reagan government intends to saddle the Salvadoran people with in the future. In view of this situation, we firmly and categorically state: We will not allow the strangling of the economy for the people's war so long as Reagan continues sending hundreds of million dollars to finance the counterinsurgency war. We will not allow this matter to be construed as the humanization of the conflict. Those who ask us to forsake collecting a war tax on the wealthy for the sake of humanizing the conflict will have a moral argument only if they first demand an end to the U.S. Government's financing of the counterinsurgency war.

13. Although most of the charges are false, and at any rate there is no comparison with the FMLN's alleged logistical supplies from abroad with the regime's supplies, we are prepared to accept controls to eliminate them if the Army also suspends receiving supplies of weapons and war materiel from the United States. (?It is alleged) that the U.S. military aid to the dictatorship is needed because the FMLN is receiving weapons from Nicaragua and Cuba. Defense Minister General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova commented on this aid, saying that U.S. aid is vital but would not be needed if the terrorists did not receive aid from abroad. Read LA PRENSA GRAFICA, 14 August 1985. In the face of such an argument, which serves to justify the growing U.S. intervention in our country, we state:

A. The FMLN's right to acquire weaponry is morally and militarily unquestionable, especially considering the current level of U.S. intervention.

B. In any event, the ratio of supplies the FMLN receives from abroad can never be above a 1 to 5,000 ratio when compared with the supplies the Salvadoran Armed Forces receive from the Reagan government. Since we are surrounded by countries with proimperialist governments, the U.S. Army and the CIA have had no trouble exerting such control over our borders, coasts, and airspace, eliminating bigger possibilities for getting supplies.

C. It is ridiculous to try to explain the war the FMLN has been waging for the past 5 years based on those alleged supplies. The explanation is that we are a genuinely popular movement, which is deeply rooted in the people's wishes. We obtain our weapons chiefly by snatching them from the enemy during clashes and making them in the workshops located in the FMLN's rearguard territory, in our country. We also have diverse home-made weapons and ammunition, taking advantage of the corruption prevalent in the dictatorship's Armed Forces.

D. After making these explanations, we must state categorically that we are prepared to negotiate an agreement whereby the two sides relinquish receiving weapons and war materiel from abroad and establish mechanisms for verification to ensure compliance with the agreement created.

14. We maintain our proposal for an overall solution that we took to Ayagualo as a basis for an overall political solution. It was agreed at La Palma that the proposals of both parties were to be discussed at the negotiating table. At the subsequent meeting at Ayagualo, we presented our proposal for an overall solution to the conflict. However, and as we already said, as soon as the meeting concluded, Duarte annulled the commitment saying that he would not discuss our proposal. We have not rejected discussing the proposal presented by Duarte at La Palma and any other he may wish to present, and we demand that our proposal also be discussed. Our proposal for an overall solution to the conflict is serious and realistic, and it could serve as a basis for a negotiated political solution that would lead to peace with liberty and justice, as our people demand. Any topics to be discussed at the negotiating table should be included in a plan of overall solution and not as an isolated element that could even be (?used) to obtain military advantages.

Duarte's suggestion to the effect that the causes originating the conflict no longer exist and thus the FMLN should lay down its weapons is not realistic and was not planned for negotiations but purely for the sake of appearances to help Reagan to prolong the war. This proposal does not leave any margin for the successive discussions of the problems arising from the realities of the war that will lead us to a negotiated solution. On the contrary, our proposal of an overall solution does allow for discussion within a framework of a gradual process of problem resolution.

15. Dialogue should be serious, public, and opened to the participation of all sectors of the nation.

A. It was agreed at La Palma to discuss the proposals of both parties at the negotiating table, but after Ayagualo, Duarte announced he would not discuss ours.

B. Regulations were approved at Ayagualo for the operation of the special commission for dialogue, created by the agreements at La Palma, to seriously prepare and ensure the continuity of the dialogue process, but both the special commission and the regulations are now dead letters for the government.

C. After Ayagualo, the government refused to meet another commitment reached there by systematically preventing the evacuation from the country of the FMLN war-disabled. In the face of this frustrating reality for these people, we feel it is necessary to adopt a public commitment and measures that will guarantee the seriousness of dialogue and the continuity of the same [words indistinct] without any results for peace. Among these guarantees, we wish to point out the following:

1) A public commitment by both parties to fulfill the agreements of La Palma and Ayagualo, and those which might be reached in future meetings of dialogue.

2) To accept the principle of equality of rights and obligations by both parties in the dialogue process, as included in the agreements of La Palma and Ayagualo.

3) The main guarantee of the seriousness with which each party goes to the dialogue, and that this dialogue will lead to just peace, means that the adoption of substantive agreements will be made public, will be held inside El Salvador, and will be open to all national sectors for discussion of the proposals for solution of both parties.

This is the basic, democratic, and participative meaning of the agreement reached at La Palma of organizing a national forum of dialogue that should be met as soon as possible. This is the position we have upheld and will maintain at the dialogue. We frankly present this before our people so that they will consider and discuss it.

Our proposal for a political solution is realistic and sensible. It does not demand disarming or dismantling the government or the Armed Forces. What we are proposing is a solution to guarantee the Salvadoran people their right to freely decide on their fate and to open the possibilities of struggling in a democratic manner for their own projects.

Within this framework, all social and political forces and all sectors of our people interested in achieving a political situation that will guarantee a just peace should have a space for debating this proposal, incorporating its own proposals for enriching it and putting it into practice. The Salvadoran people have a right to learn and fully debate the true objectives and reasons for the government's position in the face of dialogue. Duarte is obligated to frankly tell the people what he seeks. His refusal to continue with the dialogue and his insistence that the dialogue be private and held abroad means he is afraid the Salvadoran people will learn in detail his real stand concerning the dialogue.

His charges that we want a tactical dialogue creates a smoke screen to hide his lack of willingness to continue this dialogue process and reach a political solution. If he is really so sure that this is our stand, why does Duarte insist that this dialogue not be held in a public manner, why does Duarte not want a national forum to discuss the war problems and the political solution?

As a propaganda move, Duarte and the government proposed a public dialogue in the interior of the country for the La Palma meeting, but now they argue that the public dialogue is a show [preceding word in English] and propaganda. We feel peace is an issue of national interest and to reach it, through dialogue, a consensus must be reached of all Salvadorans concerning the negotiated political solution to the conflict. To this effect, public dialogue is an unjust logic and a political confrontation in which the people and the various sectors of the nation are well aware of the ideas and arguments of both parties.

This participation process leaves without any sense the discussion of whether the dialogue is tactical for one group or the other, which will determine that the dialogue will serve peace and lead to the solution of the conflict. This is not the intention of the groups, rather it is the justice of their positions and the support they may have from the majority sectors of the nation. Thus, the dialogue cannot be private. On the contrary, the nonexistence of a frank and clear debate facing the people will leave space only for military confrontation and U.S. intervention.

It is not serious to resort to propaganda excuses when the peace of the country is at stake. If they preach democracy, why then do they fear the debate of ideas and arguments? Is it not better perhaps to have political debates in a national forum as the path for peace than to have to continue confronting each other only on the battlefields where the Salvadorans who die have a right to know if the group with which they are fighting is on the just side or not?

To open a political debate is to permit the participation of the entire nation in the political solution of the conflict. Because the majority of the people favor peace, this will permit the achievement of a just peace and an end to the war. If the government persists in its path, refusing to seriously participate in the dialogue, the course of the struggle on the battlefield and the political rejection [sancion politica] of the Salvadoran people who are determined to liberate themselves, will eloquently show that Reagan, Duarte, and the high command's current obstinacy in seeking our military defeat is doomed to fail.

The FMLN is prepared for one or another alternative, but once again we declare our preference and desire to seriously take the path of dialogue.

16. The dialogue as an effort for a political solution requires a mediation that, to contribute to that effort, must maintain an impartial conduct of respect for the equal rights of both sides. It also requires a small group of witnesses acceptable to both sides. The intermediary must maintain strict impartiality and a detailed and accurate record of minutes and agreements, making public those that both sides agree upon. The position of intermediary cannot be delegated without the explicit consent of both sides. With the objective of reinforcing this guarantee, we maintain in effect our proposal of establishing a small group of dialogue-witnesses mutually accepted by the sides from the moment that the negotiations for the peace agreement begin.

El Salvador, November 1985.

[Signed] FMLN General Command. Commanders Roberto Roca, Ferman Cienfuegos, Joaquín Villalobos, Leonel Gonzalez, Jorge Shafick Handal.

HONDURAS

ARMY DENIES COMBAT IN GOLFO DE FONSECA

PA210257 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0233 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 20 Nov (ACAN-EFE) — The Honduran Army said it knows nothing about an attack on Nicaraguan patrol boats in the Golfo de Fonseca, in the Pacific Ocean, as reported by the Nicaraguan Government.

The Honduran Army Public Relations Office told ACAN-EFE early this evening: "We have not received any report, even from the High Command, of our naval units clashing with Nicaraguan coastguard vessels." The report from Managua also mentions three Honduran Air Force planes in the attack on two Nicaraguan coastguard vessels.

The Honduran Air Force reported from Tegucigalpa that "we have not received any report of our Air Force units being involved in any mission in the Golfo de Fonseca." The Navy and Air Force public relations offices said they would consult the High Command and "could probably give an official report tomorrow."

According to the Nicaraguan Government two Piranha boats and three unidentified planes, all coming from Honduras, attacked the two Nicaraguan coastguard vessels in Nicaraguan waters in the Golfo de Fonseca.

The report from Managua also says that the Honduran units returned to their territory after a few minutes of combat. The report does not mention any casualties.

The Nicaraguan Government said that the Foreign Ministry was drafting a protest note to be sent to the Honduran Government. However, the Honduran Foreign Secretariat said early this evening that it had not received any protest note from Nicaragua.

SUAZO CORDOVA ADDRESSES NATION ON ELECTIONS

PA210234 Tegucigalpa Domestic Service in Spanish 0136 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Address by President Roberto Suazo Cordova to the nation on 20 November -- live or recorded]

[Text] Dear fellow citizens: We are only a few days away from the electoral event that must become a testimony which reasserts our abidance of and adherence to democratic principles. On 24 November all Honduran citizens who are eligible to exercise their right to a free vote will come to the electoral ballot boxes to elect the president of the Republic, the presidential designates, deputies to the National Congress, and members of the municipal corporations. This is a significant and historic event in our political and republican life. It is precisely this history which proves that democracy has not always prevailed in our dear Honduras; instead, actions which violate the law have been enforced against the people's will, paving the way for the whims of those who resort to the use of force.

In 1980 we started a democratic consolidation process in Honduras; this has not been and is not an easy task. It is a serious responsibility which we have faced with decision, responsibility, and courage. We have been successful because we have received the support of two factors, which are essential for the destiny of our homeland. I am talking about the support received from our people, our rural and urban sectors, who have a deeply-rooted faith in the benefits of democracy as the essential factor for progress; I also refer to our Armed Forces, which have always proved their firm determination to ensure that a democratic, representative, popular, and pluralist regime always prevails in Honduras. Our Armed Forces, comprised of dignified soldiers, have always known and know how to respond with a civic conscience so that the people may exert their sovereign rights without any kind of obstacle.

We have had to govern amidst a highly complex situation, particularly internally, due to economic and social problems and the lack of understanding by some political groups, which have used stubbornness and insults as the strange guidelines for their conduct.

However, the complex situation has been even more evident in the international sector: the crisis in Central America and the threat of a totalitarian and expansionist regime which has sought to undermine and weaken the democratic stability which prevails in Honduras. However, we have maintained our policy which advocates peace, comprehensible and overall negotiations within the framework of the Contadora Group; supports security with adequate mechanisms to defend Honduras; opts for democracy, for a better system of life and government; and advocates cooperation for economic and social development.

I think that citizens who are aware of the fact that Honduras needs to achieve progress will always bear this in mind, and they will remember this when they cast their ballot to elect the highest authorities in our country. I feel, as a Honduran citizen, that the exercise of our right to vote is an act of credibility in our democratic institutions; it is an act which proves the Honduran people's intelligence and capacity to distinguish between those who have the necessary experience for governing with honesty and those who today talk about freedom and justice even though they have been accomplices and participants in oppression and dictatorships.

We are dealing with an act of faith and human sensibility, because we identify with our people's highest goals with faith and human sensibility. The people are sovereign and will freely elect their leaders; thus, we are fully confident that our people -- with that instinct and wisdom which characterizes the Honduran people -- will cast their vote in favor of those candidates that are not compromised by an ignominious past. They will elect the candidates whose honorable attitude, conciliatory nature, integrity, and devotion for national interests will bring Honduras forward and promote its national and international prestige.

I address this message to you in my capacity as president of this country that belongs to all of us on the occasion of the upcoming presidential elections to convey to all citizens my voice of encouragement and optimism.

May the electoral tournament of 24 November set an example to the community of civilized nations. Hondurans will thus draft a shining page in history that will teach a lesson to this and upcoming generations.

The phase of the electoral race that has concluded to give way to Sunday's election has been characterized by inflamed passions. Even the president of the Republic has been the target a reckless accusations made by those who lack moral authority to judge the public actions of a leader that has completely devoted himself to the fulfillment of his responsibilities. I believe in the people. I believe that the voice of sovereign people is the voice of God. That is why I also believe that the accusations made against me -- principally those made by traditional adversaries in the political organization I am honored to be a member of -- had no end other than to satisfy petty appetites to the detriment of the Republic's honor.

Those Hondurans who have trampled the people's rights cannot speak of freedom. Those Hondurans who have impudently and savagely walked over the people's sovereignty to promote hideous dictatorships cannot speak of democracy. Those Hondurans who have brought about stagnation, economic backwardness, and social inequality cannot speak of justice. Those Hondurans who have conspired to keep the country in the lowest echelons of development, preventing collective well-being, cannot speak of progress. Those Hondurans who have been accomplices in unprecedented actions that clash with probity in the handling of the public estate and have participated actively and directly in the institutional chaos, political anarchy, and administrative bankruptcy cannot speak of honesty. May those accusations stand as a lesson so that the disgraceful past will not be repeated in history. May those accusations be blown away with the wind so that they may be erased from the minds of all good Hondurans, because as I have said before, trust is derived from the forces of the nation.

I urge all Hondurans to participate in this civic feast with mutual respect, without poisonous darts, and without actions of betrayal that seek to discredit honest peoples. May we go to the elections in the hope for a more noble and respected nation, because that is the nation we have always aspired to.

Accept, Hondurans my fraternal greeting and these words that convey my democratic spirit as a citizen and president who governed with the people's support, has the people's support, and who will be eternally grateful to the Honduran people, the expression of generosity and hope.

Greetings, Hondurans.

PRESIDENT CRITICIZES U.S. FOR 'MISTAKES'

PA190425 Paris AFP in Spanish 0247 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 18 Nov (AFP) -- Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova has criticized the U.S. Government for the latter's support for regimes established by force in Latin America, thus fostering the installation of leftist governments or the appearance of domestic armed conflicts.

Suazo Cordova made the statement referring to the Honduran political process, that will end in the coming 24 November elections. He said: "In Honduras, problems are settled through votes rather than bullets." He indicated that such convulsion occur "in those countries that have been subjected to regimes imposed by force and, particularly, to electoral fraud." Suazo asserted: "One of the mistakes of the U.S. policy is that, in many Latin American countries, the military meddled in politics and counted votes over the telegraph. This was a serious mistake." Suazo said: I have already told this to U.S. delegates when they visited me."

He also stressed: "When the military won elections through fraud, the people were frustrated for 10, 20, or 50 years. That's when subversion appears and offers to solve the majority's problems." Specifically, Suazo referred to El Salvador, saying: "A fratricidal struggle has been going on for almost 6 years. A large Army relies on sufficient military support, particularly from the United States, yet this Army keeps fighting guerrillas on and on and on."

He said finally: "Thanks to the Honduran people's intelligence and the Armed Forces' unrestricted support, that plague (subversion) has not been turned loose here. I feel confident that it will not prosper here in Honduras."

NICARAGUAHONDURAN INCURSION IN GOLFO DE FONSECA PROTESTED

PA202359 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 2310 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Protest note sent by Acting Foreign Minister Jose Leon Talavera to Honduran Foreign Secretary Edgardo Paz Barnica "this afternoon;" place not given -- read by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Angela (Caballo); live or recorded]

[Text] Mr Secretary:

I address Your Excellency in connection with the following developments:

At 1130 today a coastguard vessel of the Sandinist Navy conducting a routine patrol mission in Nicaraguan territorial waters of the Golfo de Fonseca was attacked by three "Piranha" boats and three unidentified aircraft flying from the direction of Honduras. The attack prompted an exchange of fire that lasted several minutes, after which the attacking air and sea craft withdrew toward Honduran territory.

The Nicaraguan Government, in presenting its most formal and emphatic protest over this new aggression and violation of Nicaraguan airspace and territorial waters, which constitutes a provocation the aim of which is not known, issues an urgent call to the Honduran Government to adopt the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of incidents of this nature, which in no way contribute to the regional peace efforts the Contadora Group is promoting at this time, when the plenipotentiary representatives of the Central American and Contadora Group countries are meeting in Panama.

I take the opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the token of my highest consideration and esteem.

EMBASSY IN BOLIVIA CLOSED DUE TO 'WAR ECONOMY'

PA210106 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 0018 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] Nicaragua has closed down its embassy in Bolivia in response to the war economy. The war economy Nicaragua is living under has forced the Sandinist government to reduce the operations of several of its embassies, including its mission in Bolivia, Mauricio Cuadra, Nicaragua's ambassador in that country, reported today in La Paz.

The diplomat, who works out of Lima, Peru, indicated that diplomatic relations between La Paz and Managua are very good and smooth-running, and that office closing down constitutes neither a step backward nor a reduction in those relations.

CONTRA ATTACK ON SANTO DOMINGO REPELLED BY EPS

PA201940 Managua Radio Noticias in Spanish 1200 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Report issued by the Defense Ministry in Managua on 19 November -- read by announcer]

[Text] The EPS [Sandinist People's Army] has again repelled the mercenaries' plans to attack our people. It has dealt another crushing military blow to the enemy during its criminal attacks on the civilian population. At 0830 today, 19 November, a large group of counterrevolutionaries tried to attack the town of Santo Domingo in Chontales Department. They were repelled by the EPS' permanent troops and militias along with the support of the Sandinist Air Force. The battle lasted until 1330.

As a result of the fighting 41 counterrevolutionaries were annihilated and a large number of supplies were seized. The mercenary group withdrew from the area and our troops are pursuing them. On our side, we regret the death of two EPS companeros. Eight civilians were wounded in the mercenary attack.

Managua, 19 November 1985 [Signed] Defense Ministry Public and Foreign Relations Directorate

REPORTAGE ON DAMAGE CAUSED BY HURRICANE KATE

1 Dead, 1 Missing

FL202117 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1504 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] Hurricane Kate has caused serious damage to the national economy. One dead and one missing are the human losses reported so far in Havana. These should be considered low due to the intensity of the storm.

Sugarcane areas suffered great damage. This forces us to reschedule the harvest plan. Camaguey and Ciego de Avila municipalities practically lost their banana crops. The hurricane also caused serious damage to sugarmills, warehouses, poultry and swine centers, industries, schools, and houses, including the loss of consumption goods. The national power system was interrupted, causing losses of goods stored in cold-storage rooms, including some export goods.

The hurricane also caused serious damage in northern Cuba, especially in Varadero, Caibarien, and Yagajay municipalities. Measures taken by the civil defense, mass organizations, and the people's cooperation prevented greater losses.

The country will make special efforts in an attempt to repair state and private property damages. Once more, our people will be ready to recover from the losses and move forward.

Preliminary Reports

FL202350 Havana Television Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Excerpts] Hurricane Kate has caused considerable damage in its passage through several provinces, according to preliminary information received at this station. The country in general and -- in all the areas affected -- the defense councils, units of the territorial troops militia [MTT], special forces, and the entire population are making great efforts to resolve the problems.

According to preliminary reports from Matanzas, the hurricane caused considerable losses. In the municipality of Jovellanos, banana plantations were seriously damaged, as were cane plantations. In Colon, more than 200 houses were damaged, as were the hospital, chicken farms, fertilizer storehouses, and other installations. The zones most affected in Matanzas were Varadero and Cardenas. In Playa Azul the ocean divided the town into three parts, and in Cardenas the storehouses of the Jose Antonio Echeverria Factory were damaged. In Jaguey Grande, the winds damaged the citrus fruit packaging plant.

Hurricane Kate caused still unevaluated serious damage in Villa Clara, where greater damage was prevented thanks to the measures taken by the provincial and municipal councils. In Caibarien the hurricane caused problems in port and fishing industry installations. About 25 houses were destroyed and many more damaged, together with the warehouse of the Patrice Lumumba Tanning Factory and pig and chicken farms. Damage to cane plantations and vegetable farms was considerable. Also in Caibarien, 26 persons were injured when buildings collapsed.

In Pinar del Rio, more than 79,000 persons were evacuated as part of the preventive measures plan. The more than 6,000 students doing agricultural labor and students at schools endangered by the hurricane were evacuated.

Railway Station, Tracks Damaged

FL210010 Havana Television Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] One of the places seriously affected by Hurricane Kate was the central station of the Cuban railways. The strong winds blew off the roofs of the station and workshops and damaged the tracks, affecting service of the national passenger lines. Notwithstanding the damage caused to railroad service from Santa Clara to Havana on the main and spur lines, railroad brigades are making a vast effort to repair everything. We believe that, with the dedication the workers have displayed since last night, national passenger train service will be restored in 48 hours and service to Pinar del Rio and Cienfuegos will be established.

3 Ports Affected

FL210322 Havana Television Service in Spanish 0100 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] Pedro Ross, chief of the Economy Department of the Central Committee, has reported that three Cuban ports have been damaged extensively by Hurricane Kate. They are the ports of Caibarien, Isabela de Sagua, and Cardenas.

He also said that efforts are being made by communications brigades from Granma, Pinar del Rio, and Havana provinces to help reestablish telephone service in provinces such as Ciego de Avila, Villa Clara, Sancti Spiritus, and Cienfuegos, which have been seriously affected.

Power Out in 3 Provinces

FL210249 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 21 Nov 85

[Text] About 45 percent of the national electric power distribution network has been affected by the passage of Hurricane Kate through the central provinces of Matanzas, Havana, and Havana city. Jorge Carballo, chief engineer of the Union of Electricity Transmission and Distribution Enterprises, said 20 brigades of linemen from unaffected provinces have been urgently mobilized to assist the affected provinces. Among the most affected are Sancti Spiritus, which is without electric service, Matanzas, with more than 80 percent of its lines out of service, and Villa Clara, in a similar situation. Ciego de Avila and the entire northern part of the province are without electricity, as is the Jaruco area in the municipality of Santa Cruz del Norte, Havana.

Fifty percent of Havana city province has no electric power, and the situation is very tense. As the director of the transmission enterprise of Havana city province, Dimas Gonzalez, has explained, electrical service in the capital will not be totally reestablished for 7 days. Priorities have been established that include refrigeration facilities, hospitals, oxygen factories, water companies, refineries, and others. The director of the Havana city province transmission enterprise said that because of the tense situation in the capital, it is difficult to forecast when nationwide electricity service will be reestablished. Nevertheless, brigades from Guantanamo, Holguin, Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey, Cienfuegos, and Pinar del Rio are working intensely.

The eastern provinces -- Cienfuegos, Isle of Youth, and Pinar del Rio -- did not suffer damage to their electric power distribution systems, so their situation is normal.

Moron Canefields 'Devastated'

FL210346 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2302 GMT 20 Nov 85

[Text] Hurricane Kate has caused serious damage in Moron, including 16 injured, more than 7,600 persons evacuated, and nearly 300 houses partially or totally destroyed. The Moron citrus fruit enterprise has advised that it calculates that 200,000 quintals of citrus fruit were destroyed by the winds of Hurricane Kate.

The loss of Santa Gertrudis bovine livestock and the destruction of pig farm installations are the greatest losses reported by the Turiguano livestock enterprise of Moron.

Hurricane Kate, when it crossed Moron, Ciego de Avila, devastated extensive canefields, which will seriously affect the 1985-86 sugarcane harvest in the province.

FOREIGN MINISTRY DELEGATES ARRIVE IN MONTEVIDEO

PA190427 Havana International Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 19 Nov 85

[Text] A delegation of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, formed by the Charge d'Affaires Jose Francisco Piedra and official Jose Rivero Acosta, arrived in Montevideo yesterday to reopen the diplomatic office and handle administrative matters until the new ambassador arrives. Piedra told PRENSA LATINA that his presence in Uruguay demonstrates the Uruguayan and Cuban peoples' desire to resume relations that in practice were never interrupted.

CARLOS LAGE CLOSES UJC COMMITTEE PLENUM

FL161404 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1200 GMT 16 Nov 85

[Text] The Fifth Congress of the Union of Young Communists [UJC] will be held in April 1987 and will define the principal areas of work of Cuban youth "heading toward the year 2000," it was reported in Havana at the eighth plenary session of the UJC National Committee. In his closing speech, Carlos Lage, alternate member of the PCC Central Committee and first secretary of the UJC, spoke of the UJC's personnel policy and political-ideological work.